Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights by Spector, Horacio
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 46 
Issue 4 Editors’ Symposium: Isaiah Berlin, Value 
Pluralism, and the Law 
Article 6 
11-1-2009 
Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights 
Horacio Spector 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Horacio Spector, Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2009). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol46/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
SPECTOR FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009 10:49 AM 
 
 819 
Value Pluralism and the                                       
Two Concepts of Rights 
HORACIO SPECTOR∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 819 
II.  THE WILL THEORY AND THE INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS ................................ 824 
III.  VALUE INCOMMENSURABILITY AND DISCOURSE INCOMMENSURABILITY: 
                 THE CASE OF RIGHTS ......................................................................................... 829 
IV.   THE MINIMAL MEANING OF RIGHTS ................................................................... 837 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct 
analysis of rights, both moral and legal.  The “Will Theory” and the 
“Interest Theory”—the two main views—can each account for various 
features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory.  The 
controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable.1  
I will contend in this paper that the discussion of “value pluralism” in 
the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of 
rights. 
 
 ∗ I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Dick Arneson, Daniel Weinstock, and 
especially my commentator, Professor Christopher Wonnell, for their helpful comments 
during the Conference on Isaiah Berlin, Value Pluralism, and the Law held at the 
University of San Diego School of Law on February 20–21, 2009.  I have also benefited 
from comments made by Marcelo Ferrante, Jeff McMahan, Guido Pincione, Dave 
Schmidtz, and Fernando Tesón. 
 1. For a state of the question, see MATTHEW H. KRAMER ET AL., A DEBATE OVER 
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 1–2 (1998). 
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Value pluralism says that there is a plurality of conflicting and 
incommensurable universal values.2  Values are said to be incommensurable 
“when they raise radically distinct considerations such that there seems, 
prima facie, to be no reason to rank one ahead of another in all or most 
cases.”3  This is the conception of incommensurability that Isaiah Berlin 
embraced.  Because it does not include a time variable, I call it 
“synchronic value pluralism.”  It centrally claims that there is no general 
procedure to rank abstract values in such a way so as to allow the 
resolution of practical conflicts in particular cases.  There is a second 
conception of value pluralism that I call “diachronic value pluralism.”  
This conception maintains the theses of rivalry and incommensurability 
of values but incorporates time as a relevant variable.  It claims that at 
any given time (t) in the course of human history there is a plurality of 
conflicting and incommensurable universal values whose existence 
started at some time earlier than t (t–1), and that it is possible for the 
plurality of values existing at t to be a proper subset of a plurality of 
values that will exist at some time later than t (t+1).  This conception is 
committed to the view that new values emerge over time according to 
various cultural, political, and economic transformations.  This does not 
mean that values are subjective or relative to a given culture.  Rather, 
values emerge at a certain time, but their existence is objective and 
universal. 
The diachronic conception of value pluralism draws on Joseph Raz’s 
theory of values.  Raz stresses the dependence of values on sustaining 
social practices.4  In fact, Raz argues that although the existence of 
values has social preconditions, as long as the preconditions are met and 
the corresponding values come into being, their existence persists 
without restrictions.5  Raz explains the asymmetry of emergence and 
continued existence in this way: 
The usual pattern is for the emergence, out of previous social forms, of a new 
set of practices, bringing into life a new form: monogamous marriage between 
partners chosen by each other, the opera, and so on, with their attendant 
excellences.  Once they come into being, they remain in existence even if the 
sustaining practices die out.6 
Now, Raz does not say that his “social dependence” thesis implies value 
pluralism.  Rather, he says that the thesis that values depend on social 
practices can accommodate value pluralism because it implies that value 
 
 2. GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 45 (2002). 
 3. Id. at 53. 
 4. JOSEPH RAZ, THE PRACTICE OF VALUE 21–22 (R. Jay Wallace ed., 2003). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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judgments depend on genres or kinds that evolve culturally, for example, 
opera, sports, and democratic politics, and different genre-bound 
evaluations need not be logically contradictory.7  Therefore, Raz’s social 
dependence thesis is not the same as diachronic value pluralism, but 
there is a resemblance between the two positions. 
Political and legal culture has been diversified by the cumulative 
accretion of values that express human beings’ concerns in reaction to 
different historical predicaments.  New value paradigms coexist with 
older value paradigms because the latter are central to forms of life that 
continue to define people’s senses of identity and meaningfulness.  By 
the same token, values are incommensurable with one another because 
each value presupposes a distinct form of life that cannot be ranked 
along an ordering of forms of life.8  That is, values are incommensurable 
with each other due to the incommensurability of their supporting forms 
of life.  An outsider can interpret the value paradigm of an alien society 
even if he does not share the relevant form of life, provided he adopts a 
participant’s point of view.  In adopting the internal perspective, the 
outsider translates the beliefs and concerns of the foreign society into his 
own forms of life and value paradigms.  Other things being equal, the 
greater the distance between the outsider’s paradigms and those of the 
society he wants to understand, the higher the risk that the translation 
will only be an approximate one.9 
I will argue that the diachronic conception of value pluralism explains 
why conceptual fragmentation in normative language is a natural and 
pervasive phenomenon.  Indeed, the meaning of normative terms embedded 
in successive incommensurable value paradigms often varies so radically 
that the concepts denoted by those terms disintegrate into different 
concepts.  Specifically, I will claim that a radical change of value 
paradigm has fragmented the concept of rights, and that value 
incommensurability stands in the way of the concept’s coalescing back.  
The thesis of conceptual fragmentation of normative language explains 
in turn why the perennial debate on the analysis of rights has not yet 
been brought to a close.  In fact, rival and incommensurable value 
 
 7. Id. at 44–45. 
 8. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 157–58 (1985).  
Bernard Williams also says that different cultures or forms of life may be incommensurable 
with each other, but he does not mention values or value pluralism.  Id. 
 9. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55 (1961). 
SPECTOR FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:49 AM 
 
822 
paradigms lie behind the Will Theory and the Interest Theory.10  
Because legal systems reflect a diachronic plurality of rival and 
incommensurable values, the term right is subject to radical semantic 
variation.  Therefore, any analysis of the concept of rights that goes 
beyond their mere correlativity to duties or their relation to state 
enforcement will likely fail to explain existing linguistic practices. 
The idea to be explored in this paper is kindred to two preceding 
views, one in the philosophy of science and the other in moral 
philosophy.  The first is Paul Feyerabend’s thesis on the radical variance 
of the meaning of terms embedded in successive scientific theories.11  
Feyerabend claims that the primitive terms of a theory (T’) often cannot 
be defined by reference to the primitive descriptive terms of a different 
theory (T), nor correlated to them via correct empirical generalizations.12  
For instance, “impetus” in Aristotle’s theory of motion cannot be 
defined within the vocabulary of Newton’s mechanics.  In fact, within 
Aristotelian mechanics, “[t]he impetus of a body in empty space which 
is not under the influence of any outer force remains constant.”13  Under 
Newton’s mechanics, this proposition is empirically adequate, but there 
is no entity that acts as the cause of motion.  Momentum, the most 
obvious candidate, is rather the result of motion.  Even if we formed the 
concept of such a force, Newton’s second law would imply a zero value 
for such a force in the case of inertial motion.14 
The second view is Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis on conceptual 
fragmentation in normative discourses.  MacIntyre argues that the 
 
 10. I develop here an idea originally proposed in Horacio Spector, Is the Will 
Theory of Rights Superseded by the Hybrid Theory?, in 2 SOCIAL, POLITICAL, & LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY: LAW: METAPHYSICS, MEANING, AND OBJECTIVITY 289, 294 (Enrique 
Villanueva ed., 2007).  Chris Wellman and Siegfried Van Duffel also claim that the 
dispute over the concept of rights relies on competing values and rival paradigms: 
Christopher Heath Wellman, Feinberg’s Two Concepts of Rights, 11 LEGAL THEORY 213 
(2005); Siegfried Van Duffel, The Nature of Rights (July 9, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157282.  However, Wellman’s and 
Van Duffel’s arguments are very different from the one developed here.  For instance, 
neither Wellman nor Van Duffel discusses the relationship between value pluralism and 
the two concepts of rights. 
 11. PAUL K. FEYERABEND, Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism, in 
1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: REALISM, RATIONALISM, AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 44 (1981).  
See also Paul K. Feyerabend, On the “Meaning” of Scientific Terms, 62 J. PHIL. 266 (1965).  
This thesis overlaps with Kuhn’s famous thesis on the incommensurability of scientific 
theories, although Kuhnean incommensurability far exceeds the strictly semantic conception 
that I focus on in the text.  See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ROAD SINCE STRUCTURE 33–57 
(James Conant & John Haugeland eds., 2000). 
 12. FEYERABEND, supra note 11, at 74–91. 
 13. Id. at 64. 
 14. Id. at 57–61.  Newton’s second law of motion says that “[t]he acceleration of a 
body of mass m is related to the force acting on it by F = ma.”  N.M.J. WOODHOUSE, 
SPECIAL RELATIVITY 5 (2003). 
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Enlightenment project of trying to find a rational basis for moral beliefs 
is foredoomed to failure because it relies on an ineradicably discrepant 
set of moral beliefs and a deeply different vision of human nature.15  
MacIntyre says that the modern philosophers “inherited incoherent 
fragments of a once coherent scheme of thought and action and, since 
they did not recognize their own peculiar historical and cultural 
situation, they could not recognize the impossible and quixotic character 
of their self-appointed task.”16  For instance, he shows that the meaning 
of ought was fixed in the classical Aristotelian framework in a way that 
Enlightenment radically changed.17  Within the former framework says 
MacIntyre: 
To say what someone ought to do is at one and the same time to say what 
course of action will in these circumstances as a matter of fact lead toward a 
man’s true end and to say what the law, ordained by God and comprehended by 
reason, enjoins.  Moral sentences are thus used within this framework to make 
claims which are true or false.18 
My plan is as follows.  In Part II, I will indicate how the Will Theory 
and the Interest Theory each capture distinct features of the usage of 
right in contemporary moral and legal discourse.  However, I will also 
argue that neither of the two theories is successful in explaining all the 
properties of rights.  In Part III, I will argue that the debate between the 
two theories is irresolvable because the Will Theory and the Interest 
Theory reflect the meaning of rights within rival and incommensurable 
value paradigms existing in today’s moral and legal culture.  The 
incommensurability of the underlying value paradigms leads to radical 
variance in the meaning of the term rights, despite the obvious 
homonymy.  Specifically, I will argue that the Will Theory represents a 
fragment of a once integrated normative framework, and that it is in 
abstraction from such framework that this theory becomes beset by 
puzzles.  In turn, the Interest Theory is incompatible with the properties 
attributed to rights in the older value paradigm.  All in all, radical 
meaning variance makes a neutral external analysis of rights impossible.  
Therefore, there is no reason to try to choose between two theories that 
mistakenly assume meaning invariance of normative terms across rival 
 
 15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 51–61 (2d 
ed. 1984). 
 16. Id. at 55. 
 17. Id. at 53. 
 18. Id. 
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and incommensurable value paradigms. 
Finally, in Part IV, I will claim that the term right nonetheless has an 
invariant conceptual core across the two main value paradigms in which 
it is embedded.  Basically, rights entail state enforceability.  This 
minimal semantic overlap among various usages of rights explains the 
confusing coexistence of various value paradigms and their associated 
normative terms. 
II.  THE WILL THEORY AND THE INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS 
The Will Theory was introduced in Anglo-American legal theory by 
H.L.A. Hart under the name of “Choice Theory,” but it was classically 
defended by a number of German jurists in the nineteenth century, and 
its roots go back to Kant.19  Hart endorses the Will Theory because it can 
explain why rights reflect a distinctive concern for the individual.  Under 
this view, a right expresses the idea of “one individual being given by 
the law exclusive control, more or less extensive, over another person’s 
duty so that in the area of conduct covered by that duty the individual 
who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is 
owed.”20  Hart goes on to say that a right holder has at his disposal the 
“fullest measure of control” when he possesses: the power to waive or 
extinguish the duty, the power to enforce it by legal actions after actual 
or threatened breach of the duty, and the power to waive or extinguish 
the obligation to pay compensation for violation of the duty.21  So, for 
the Will Theory, Hohfeldian powers are central to rights.22 
In its early formulation as the “Benefit Theory,” the Interest Theory 
was first suggested by Bentham.23  Under this view, A’s having a right to 
X against B means that A is the beneficiary of B’s duty to do X.  The 
German legal scholar Rudolf von Jhering proposed a clearly 
recognizable form of the Interest Theory when he changed his 
jurisprudential position from legal formalism to legal instrumentalism.24  
Von Jhering famously defined a legal right as a “legally protected 
 
 19. N.E. Simmonds, Rights at the Cutting Edge, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES supra note 1, at 113, 135, 179. 
 20. H.L.A. HART, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162, 183 (1982). 
 21. Id. at 183–84 (footnote omitted). 
 22. For Hohfeld, a normative power is a situation in which person A can claim or 
waive another person B’s duty.  More generally, a normative power is a situation in 
which a person can modify the normative position of another by his will. 
 23. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 223–26 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 57 (H.L.A. 
Hart ed., 1970). 
 24. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 86 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
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interest.”25  In its most plausible version, proposed by Joseph Raz, the 
Interest Theory holds that A’s having a right to X against B means that an 
interest of A’s, or an aspect of his well-being, is a sufficient reason for 
holding B under a duty.26 
Both the Will Theory and the Interest Theory provide partial 
explanations of some essential features of rights in contemporary 
normative discourse, but none of them can explain the whole set of 
essential features.  Such features are that some rights are alienable but 
others are necessarily inalienable; paternalistic interferences with the 
right holder—within the range of his rights—are impermissible; all 
rights, regardless of their grounding value, outweigh or trump other 
normative considerations grounded in subjective interests; and some 
rights are more important than others. 
If rights are understood as normative positions that satisfy all of these 
features, there are no rights according to the Will Theory and the Interest 
Theory.  A noninstantiated concept of rights is not helpful because one 
essential condition of any analysis of rights is that there are some rights, 
for example, the right to liberty or privacy.  Although both theories fail, 
the reason for each theory’s failure is different.  The Will Theory fails 
because it gives us only a fragment of a once unified and coherent value 
framework.  The Interest Theory fails because it subordinates rights to 
the contingencies of varying subjective interests.  This malleable notion 
does not fit at all within a previous value paradigm that still governs our 
linguistic practices. 
Let us discuss these failures in turn.27  First, the Will Theory cannot 
account for inalienable rights, that is, for rights that the right holder 
cannot waive or relinquish.  The problem is that inalienable rights are 
considered fundamental in modern liberal culture.  It seems paradoxical 
that the most fundamental rights, like the rights to life or liberty, are 
 
 25. RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN 
STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 339 (Leipzig, Breitkopf & Härtel 1865) (author’s translation). 
 26. JOSEPH RAZ, The Nature of Rights, in THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165, 166 
(1986).  The Interest Theory has also been defended by NEIL MACCORMICK, Children’s 
Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154, 163 (1982), and D.N. MacCormick, 
Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. 
HART 189, 192 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). 
 27. There are other failures that I will not discuss in this paper.  For instance, the 
Interest Theory fails to explain why there are rights that are not in the right holder’s 
interest, such as the right to an inherited troublesome property.  See George W. Rainbolt, 
Rights Theory, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 11, 14 (2006). 
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precisely those rights for which the crucial element identified by the 
Will Theory, namely, the control over the correlative duty, is 
substantially absent.28  According to the Will Theory, inalienable rights 
cannot be full-fledged rights. 
A related problem is that the Will Theory is incapable of accounting 
for rights in criminal law contexts.  Hart says that in the criminal law 
rights have the lesser measure of control.29  But this is not a serious 
problem.  In effect, right holders do have a considerable measure of 
control under the criminal law, too, because they can usually waive the 
private law obligations whose breach is a prerequisite to considering 
certain conduct as a criminal offense.  For instance, if Amy waives her 
ownership right over her piano and no one else claims it, Matt’s taking 
control of the piano cannot count as theft.  Clearly, the right holder lacks 
this type of control with respect to murder, for example.  In many cases 
of this kind, powers are wanting because the relevant right is an 
inalienable one, so the preceding difficulty applies.  What the right 
holder cannot typically do under the criminal law is to cancel the 
offender’s criminal liability because prosecution is in most cases a 
public matter.  This would create a problem for the Will Theory if it 
were plausible to hold that victims have a right to determine the 
punishment of perpetrators. The Interest Theory cannot explain 
inalienability either.  Indeed, if rights are grounded on subjective 
interests, why could a right holder not relinquish his right if he were to 
pursue his interests more effectively in this way?  According to the 
Interest Theory, alienation or nonalienation are matters to be assessed on 
the basis of the promotion of subjective interests, and therefore, on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than as a matter of principle. 
Second, the Interest Theory cannot explain why moral rights generally 
block interferences intended to advance more successfully the rights 
holder’s interests.30  According to the nonconsequentialist view of moral 
rights, if A has a moral right to X, this right is valid whatever the 
consequences of its fulfillment or infringement.  This abstract idea 
entails that A’s moral right to X—although not relinquished—holds even 
if A does not have a subjective interest in X, and even if A does have an 
interest in non-X.  The latter clause rules out paternalistic interferences.  
Because the only basis for holding B under the duty to respect A’s right 
is an interest of A’s, B could justifiably infringe A’s right when doing so 
 
 28. MacCormick, supra note 26, at 196. 
 29. HART, supra note 20, at 184. 
 30. Eric Mack, In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights, 4 J. ETHICS 71, 84 
(2000), reprinted in RIGHTS, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 71 (Guido Pincione & Horacio 
Spector eds., 2000). 
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can advance more effectively A’s interests.  For instance, if the right to 
reject medical treatment were based on the interests of the patient, it 
might be possible to justify the imposition of a blood transfusion on a 
Jehovah’s Witness.  This difficulty also bears on the Will Theory 
because the fact that right holders have powers over correlated duties is 
consistent with allowing the government to cancel those powers when 
the government can better promote in this way the interests of the right 
holder.  Because the Will Theory fails to display the grounds of the 
relevant powers, it cannot forbid paternalism on a principled basis. 
The third problem, noted by Joseph Raz with respect to the Interest 
Theory, is that it fails to explain why the stringency of some rights does 
not match the importance of the right holder’s interests.  Raz writes that, 
more often than not, we attach greater importance to a right than to its 
alleged underlying interests.31  Because Raz conceives of rights as just 
morally protected interests, he must look elsewhere for the explanation 
of the differential importance of some rights.  So he appeals to the value 
of those rights for the common good, particularly for the sustenance of a 
liberal culture.32  Similarly, the Will Theory lacks the ability to explain 
the relative importance of various rights.  Like the Interest Theory, it 
must avail itself of further claims to justify why the right to life, for 
instance, is more important than the right to play dangerous games, such 
as Russian roulette. 
The fourth and most fundamental problem for both the Will Theory 
and the Interest Theory lies elsewhere.  Eric Mack identified this 
problem with respect to the Interest Theory.  This theory cannot account 
for the essential connection between moral rights and individuals’ 
inviolability.33  Contemporary nonconsequentialist moral philosophers 
emphasize this connection in discussing the concept of moral rights.34  
Thus, Robert Nozick has famously argued that rights are “side 
 
 31. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW 
AND POLITICS 30–32 (1994). 
 32. Id. at 33–34. 
 33. Eric Mack has argued that the prohibition of trade-offs and the principled rejection 
of paternalism are two essential features of rights.  See Mack, supra note 30, at 95–96. 
 34. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240 (1978); 2 F.M. KAMM, 
MORALITY, MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 259–89 (1996); HORACIO 
SPECTOR, AUTONOMY AND RIGHTS 163–78 (1992); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM 
OF RIGHTS 123–48 (1990); Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, in THEORIES 
OF RIGHTS 91 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1981). 
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constraints,” that is, deontic constraints.35  On this view, rights are 
correlative to moral prohibitions in the form of: “Do not violate 
constraints C.”  Thus, rights forbid treating people in certain ways, and 
they must be respected no matter the overall benefits that could be 
obtained by alternative conduct.  That is, in principle, rights may not be 
infringed even when this can lead us to greater utility overall, and more 
strikingly, even when by infringing them we can minimize the overall 
violation of rights.36  Therefore, A’s right is also independent from other 
people’s subjective interests, that is, projects, preferences, and decisions.  
This also includes cases in which ignoring or violating A’s right is 
needed to produce a greater nonmoral or moral good.  Banning such 
“maximizing” violations reflects the Kantian ideal that autonomous 
individuals are inviolable.37  However, nonconsequentialists disagree 
about the degree of inviolability to which persons are entitled.  Some 
consequentialists deny that rights are absolute and say that it is 
permissible to infringe a right if infringing it is sufficiently better for 
third parties than not infringing it is for the right holder.38 
The Interest Theory cannot explain why moral rights are side 
constraints because it regards the value of rights as based on the right 
holder’s subjective interest.  Because this interest can conflict with other 
people’s interests, the Interest Theory tends to accept the sacrifice of 
rights for the sake of overall interest maximization.  Mack’s argument is 
really more complex.  He notes that interests can have either agent-
neutral or agent-relative value.39  A’s interest has agent-neutral value 
when it is valuable to everyone, that is, when A’s interest provides 
reasons to every agent, including A.  By contrast, A’s interest has agent-
relative value when it provides reasons only to A, who is the bearer of 
the interest.  In the former case, rights fall prey to the utilitarian calculus.  
Because the normative force of rights is grounded on the right holder’s 
interests, there is always the possibility that those interests will be 
outweighed by other people’s interests.  Alternatively, if the right 
holder’s interests have only agent-relative value, the theory fails to 
explain how those interests can justify holding someone else under a 
duty.40 
 
 35. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974).  “Deontic 
constraint” is a term of art in moral philosophy that denotes a moral duty or prohibition 
that a moral agent ought to respect regardless of the consequences.  Not all deontic 
constraints are rights because some moral duties need not be correlated to rights. 
 36. Id. at 29–33.  See also SPECTOR, supra note 34, at 163–78. 
 37. NOZICK, supra note 35, at 35. 
 38. See THOMSON, supra note 34, at 151. 
 39. Mack, supra note 30, at 78–79. 
 40. Id. at 83–84. 
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The Will Theory is affected by another version of the same problem.  
This theory focuses on the powers of right holders but ignores the 
underlying autonomy-based justification.  Hart, for example, suggests 
that the justification of those powers associated with the Will Theory is 
an interest in autonomous choice.41  Under the Kantian view, however, 
rights cannot be grounded on interest—not even an interest in 
autonomous choice—because that would disregard the value of 
autonomy.  There is nothing morally special about powers that prevent 
us from ignoring them, that is, breaching the controlled duties, if that is 
needed to produce greater good or to minimize the violations of rights.  
Although the Interest Theory includes an inadequate form of 
justification, the Will Theory entirely lacks justification.  In either case, 
however, the result is much the same: an inability to capture the 
anticonsequentialist features of rights in today’s moral language.42 
III. VALUE INCOMMENSURABILITY AND DISCOURSE 
INCOMMENSURABILITY: THE CASE OF RIGHTS 
Moral and legal rights were deep-seated in the value paradigm of 
individual autonomy (V1) prevailing from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries.  The epitome of this paradigm value is Kant’s 
theory of rights.  Under his doctrine, legal rights are public and 
institutional ways of recognizing the status of persons as autonomous 
beings.43  Because rights are based on the status of individuals as 
autonomous agents, they are part and parcel of a fundamentally 
deontological, nonconsequentialist moral outlook.  Legal rights respect 
individual autonomy by vesting in individuals the powers that the Will 
Theory picks out.  It is no surprise that the Will Theory focuses on rights 
in property and contract law, which are the cornerstone of Kant’s 
conception of law.44  The Will Theory captures only a fragment of the 
meaning of rights in the value paradigm of individual autonomy.  
 
 41. HART, supra note 20, at 188–89. 
 42. Gopal Sreenivasan has offered an ingenious “hybrid theory” that tries to avoid 
the difficulties.  See Gopal Sreenivasan, A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights, 25 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 257 (2005), reprinted in 2 SOCIAL, POLITICAL, & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: LAW: 
METAPHYSICS, MEANING, AND OBJECTIVITY, supra note 10, at 263.  I have criticized this 
theory in Spector, supra note 10. 
 43. Arthur Ripstein, Kant on Law and Justice, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO 
KANT’S ETHICS 161 (Thomas E. Hill, Jr. ed., 2009). 
 44. See Jürgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 772 (1996). 
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Therefore, the Will Theory is an incomplete account of a more 
substantial value paradigm, that is, the paradigm of individual autonomy, 
which once dominated the normative discourse.  Within this paradigm, 
rights are “trumps” grounded in personal autonomy and capable of 
overriding a good deal of consequentialist considerations.  If the Will 
Theory were restored in such a way so as to mention both powers and to 
display their autonomy-based justification, it could easily explain why 
moral rights act as deontic constraints.  Moreover, it could explain why 
some rights are inalienable, that is, because they are indispensable for 
preserving man’s autonomous rational nature; why paternalistic 
interferences with right holders are generally unacceptable, that is, 
because they disregard rational autonomous agency; and why some 
rights are more important than others regardless of the strength of their 
underlying subjective interests, that is, because those more important 
rights are prerequisites for the existence and action of rational human 
agency. 
The exemplar I use for the value paradigm of individual autonomy is 
Kant’s Doctrine of Right, the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals, in 
which he examines at length the idea of moral rights as elements of a 
theory of justice.45  Kant poses a fascinating question: “But why is the 
doctrine of morals usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of 
duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights have 
reference to duties?”46  He goes on to answer: 
The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral laws, and 
so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral imperative, which 
is a proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others 
under obligation, that is, the concept of a right, can afterwards be explicated.47 
Kant thinks that although duties have an epistemic priority over rights, 
rights are fundamental in the justification of law as a system of external 
sanctions.  In Kant’s words, “Right is therefore the sum of the conditions 
under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another 
in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”48  This principle seems 
to be an application of Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” to the specific 
problem of distributing the freedom of autonomous beings through a 
system of universal coercive norms.49  In a sense, both duties and rights 
 
 45. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31–32 (Mary Gregor ed. & 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
 46. Id. at 31. 
 47. Id. at 31–32 (emphasis and footnotes omitted). 
 48. Id. at 24. 
 49. The Categorical Imperative is the fundamental unconditioned principle of Kant’s 
moral theory.  In its first, best known formula, the Categorical Imperative says: “[A]ct only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
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have a subordinate role in Kant.  It is one fundamental duty—enshrined 
by the Categorical Imperative—that grounds the whole system of duties 
and rights.  Practical reason, a necessary aspect of the noumenal self, 
imposes this duty on the moral agent and, in so doing, secures his 
freedom—both negative freedom from external causation and positive 
freedom or self-determination.  At that very abstract level, moral duty 
and metaphysical freedom come together and indeed constitute two 
inextricable sides to the same thing.  Hegel expresses this view in a 
forceful way: “In duty, the individual liberates himself so as to attain 
substantial freedom.”50 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the paradigm of 
individual autonomy and its associated picture of rights protecting the 
liberty spheres of autonomous and inviolable individuals started to give 
way to a different paradigm centered on subjective interests, especially 
those appertaining to politically influential groups.51  Rights ceased to be 
exclusively regarded as a way of recognizing the status of autonomous 
agents and also became normative devices for enhancing the interests of 
some groups—unionized workers, consumers, and so on—or for 
implementing social goals such as solidarity and welfare.  Yet, the old 
paradigm did not vanish.  Rather, both paradigms started to clash in legal 
and moral thought. 
The value paradigm of subjective interests (V2) represented a 
fundamental change with respect to the value paradigm of individual 
autonomy.  Instead of viewing law as an institution to demarcate and 
protect spheres of nonintervention, the new paradigm regards law as an 
instrument for seeking collective goals.  We might speculate that the 
new paradigm was facilitated by the emergence of an industrial economy 
and a concomitant urban society in which a frictionless, physical 
demarcation of ownership rights was no longer a recipe for coping with 
the violent and intractable conflicts that those new forms of life had 
aroused.  Because the range of collective goals to be sought under the 
new paradigm is vast and varies with the political equilibriums of the 
 
universal law.”  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31 (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 50. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 192 (Allen W. Wood 
ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). 
 51. Habermas, supra note 44, at 771–72.  See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS 
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 18–46 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728–30 
(1976). 
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day, it is congenial with the working of democratic decisionmaking 
institutions envisaged as “machines” that produce collective interests 
worthy of support and, therefore, various generations of rights that claim 
for political recognition and enforcement. 
The difference in value paradigms explains the radical semantic 
variation of the term right as deployed in the paradigm of individual 
autonomy and the paradigm of subjective interests.  That is, because the 
values shaping each paradigm are rival and incommensurable with each 
other, the meaning of rights in V1 (rights1) and that of rights in V2 
(rights2) are radically distinct.  The point is that rights1 and rights2 are 
radically different concepts because they are embedded in rival and 
incommensurable value paradigms.  Today’s normative language includes 
both terms but in ambiguous fashion. 
Role/inferential semantics provide the most fruitful framework to 
discuss the radical variation of rights in connection with diachronic 
value pluralism.52  Under my favored interpretation of the semantics of 
moral terms, the meaning of a term (t) is not given by a network of 
platitudinous propositions in which t is a node.  Rather, t’s meaning is 
given by a set of basic rules that govern deductive inferences from or to 
propositions that centrally contain t.  Accordingly, the meaning of rights 
in the paradigm of individual autonomy, that is, rights1, might be given, 
for instance, by the following basic inference rules: 
  
 
 52. The literature on role/inferential semantics of moral or legal terms includes: 
Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 817–18, 822 (1957); Aleksander Peczenik & 
Horacio Spector, A Theory of Moral Ought-Sentences, 73 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND 
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 441, 441–42 (1987); Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit, Moral 
Functionalism and Moral Motivation, 45 PHIL. Q. 20, 22–24 (1995); Ralph Wedgwood, 
Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms, 110 PHIL. REV. 1, 12–13 (2001); Giovanni 
Sartor, Legal Concepts: An Inferential Approach 7 (Eur. Univ. Inst., LAW Working 
Paper No. 2008/03, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1093627. 
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(1) Acceptance of “B’s doing X with respect to A 
disrespects A’s autonomous rational agency” commits 
one to accepting “A has a right against B that B does not 
do X.” 
(2) Acceptance of “A has a right against B that B does 
not do X ” commits one to accepting “B has a duty to A 
not to do X.” 
(3) Acceptance of “right R is essential to maintain A’s 
autonomous rational agency” commits one to accepting 
“A cannot relinquish right R,” that is, R is inalienable. 
 
By contrast, the meaning of rights in the paradigm of subjective 
interests, that is, rights2, might be conveyed, for instance, through the 
following rules: 
 
(1*) Acceptance of “B’s doing X with respect to A 
frustrates a relevant subjective interest of A’s” commits 
one to accepting “A has a right against B that B does not 
do X.” 
(2) Acceptance of “A has a right against B that B does 
not do X ” commits one to accepting “B has a duty to A 
not to do X.” 
(3*) Acceptance of “the subjective interest grounding 
right R is more important than the subjective interest 
grounding right R” commits one to accepting “other 
things being equal, R is more important than R.” 
 
This semantic approach makes it clear why the radical difference in 
the values that infuse the paradigm of individual autonomy and the 
paradigm of subjective interests change the semantic networks that 
provide the meaning of rights in such a way that rights1 and rights2 are 
irreducibly distinct.  In fact, the set of rules (1), (2), and (3), which 
govern the meaning of rights1, and the set of rules (1*), (2), and (3*), 
which govern the meaning of rights2, cannot be coalesced into a coherent 
set containing the five rules (rule (2) is one and the same in both sets).  
In effect, rule (3) cannot be applied to rights2 because, under the 
paradigm of subjective interests, it should be left to the right holder to 
establish whether relinquishing a right of his furthers more effectively 
his subjective interests.  In turn, rule (3*) is inapplicable to rights1 
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because, under the paradigm of individual autonomy, the importance of 
rights cannot be grounded on the strength of the underlying subjective 
interests.  Additionally, rules (1) and (1*) cannot be blended in an 
overarching network of semantic rules because autonomous rational 
agency and the satisfaction of subjective interests are different and 
incommensurable values. 
Indeed, under the paradigm of individual autonomy, the value of 
autonomous rational agency is the only possible value, and therefore, its 
commensurability with any other value is logically ruled out.  If the 
values of rational autonomous agency and satisfaction of subjective 
interests were commensurable with each other or with a higher order 
value, a coalescing network encompassing the networks corresponding 
to rights1 and rights2 might emerge.  However, given that the underlying 
values are rival and incommensurable, the two networks cannot be 
consistently reshuffled, except by the expedient of maintaining common 
rule (2) and deleting all of the others.  This drastic method would render 
the concept of rights superfluous once we introduce the concept of 
duties.  Because no useful reshuffling of the semantic networks is 
possible, conceptual fragmentation generates radical meaning variance 
under conditions of value incommensurability. 
The thesis of the radical variation of the meaning of rights can be also 
expressed by appealing to the parallelism with theoretical terms.  Just as 
theoretical terms deployed in theory (T) may be impossible to translate 
into the terminology of a theory (T’), the term rights embodied in value 
paradigm V1 cannot be translated into the normative vocabulary of value 
paradigm V2 because the semantic networks defining the meaning of 
each term cannot be coalesced back into an overlapping network due to 
the rivalry and incommensurability of the underlying values. 
What is the relation between diachronic value pluralism and the 
semantic fragmentation of normative terms?  Let us say that a normative 
term (t) is embedded in value paradigm (V) when some statements 
containing t are true in all possible worlds in which the values embodied 
in V exist but are false in some possible worlds in which the values 
embodied in V do not exist.  For instance, the term right is embedded in 
the paradigm of individual autonomy because the statement that “people 
have a right to privacy” is true in all possible worlds in which individual 
autonomy is valuable but false in some possible worlds in which 
individual autonomy is not a value, for example, a world (W) in which 
privacy does not contribute to any value existing in W.  Now if values 
deployed in V1 and V2 are rival and incommensurable, the meaning of t 
in V2 may be radically different from the meaning of T in V1.  Both 
paradigms may have inconsistent normative consequences because they 
embody conflicting values.  This inconsistency is likely to be reflected in 
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the meaning of t.  And given that those values are incommensurable with 
each other, the normative inconsistency cannot be reconciled by a 
procedure that ranks or weighs those values.  Rivalry and incommensurability 
of value paradigms generate the radical semantic fragmentation of the 
normative terms embedded in those paradigms.  The term radical means 
here that a coalescing back of the fragmented meanings is not possible.  
To put it briefly, value-laden normative terms are radically different in 
meaning if the values with which they are laden are both rival and 
incommensurable to one another. 
Because the thesis about the radical semantic variance of value-laden 
normative terms bears resemblance to the thesis of the radical meaning 
variation of theory-laden scientific terms, it is useful to note that there 
are three main differences between the semantic variation of scientific 
terms and that of normative terms such as right. 
First, although theoretical terms cannot be defined in a theoretically 
neutral language because they are theory-laden, some normative terms 
cannot be defined in a value-neutral language because they are value-
laden, and the values with which they are laden are, in turn, 
incommensurable with each other.  This means that although meaning 
variance of theoretical terms explains the incommensurability of 
scientific theories, meaning variance of normative terms depends on 
value incommensurability.  The notion of dependence relevant here is a 
negative one.  If the value paradigms in which normative terms are 
embedded were commensurable with one another, the fragmented 
semantic networks could coalesce back into a consistent network, and 
radical meaning variance would not exist.  However, this process is not 
possible because rival and incommensurable value paradigms have 
irreconcilably inconsistent normative consequences. 
Second, although there is widespread consensus that scientific terms 
have a fundamental referential or extensional dimension, many 
metaethical positions assign, if at all, only a limited importance to the 
referential function of normative terms.53  Empirical terms in scientific 
 
 53. Metaethics is the philosophical study of moral language and thinking; it is 
typically conducted in a second order language or metalanguage.  Noncognitivist 
metaethical theories emphasize the expressive function of moral utterances, instead of 
their denotation or reference—also called extension.  See SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN 
QUASI-REALISM 54 (1993); SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS 49–50 (1998); 
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE BRITISH MORALISTS AND THE INTERNAL ‘OUGHT’: 1640–1740, at 
9–10 (1995); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 7–8 (1990); R.M. HARE, 
FREEDOM AND REASON 189–91 (1963); R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 207–08 (1981); 
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theories refer to the natural world, and therefore, co-reference of 
empirical terms used by older and newer theories may allow theory 
comparability.  Meaning invariance secured by co-reference may be all 
we need to compare two theories and choose one as closer to the truth.  
However, this does not apply to theoretical terms, such as mass, that lack 
direct reference to empirical phenomena.  In the absence of co-reference, 
the meaning of theoretical terms is established by clusters of interrelated 
terms.  Theoretical terms can be likened to normative terms because 
none of them can be solely defined in an extensional way.  Because no 
referential analysis can exhaust the meaning of a normative term such as 
rights, the semantic variation of this term implies that both “rights-
discourses” are untranslatable to each other.  Therefore, showing that 
meaning variance is compatible with invariance of reference is of no 
consequence for the discussion of the semantic incommensurability of 
rights. 
Finally, unlike successive scientific theories that entirely replace older 
ones, value paradigms typically evolve by accretion, which means that at 
any given time we do not encounter pure paradigms but rather mixed 
value paradigms that maintain older ones—though often within more 
restricted scopes.  Thus, in contemporary legal cultures, the individual 
autonomy paradigm and the paradigm of collective interests coexist in 
Berlinian fashion, giving rise to tensions and conflicts that cannot be 
solved by reference to one neutral, all-encompassing value.  Older 
individualist values still are there because even though most of us are not 
farmers and ranchers in modern industrial democracies, we stick to the 
view of ourselves as autonomous beings, though perhaps uncomfortably 
so within crowded cities and factories. 
Although the Will Theory fragmentarily captures the classical features 
of rights, especially those associated with rights in deontological moral 
thinking, the Interest Theory seeks to accommodate the widely different 
kinds of rights that modern legal systems recognize and their various 
justifications in subjective interests.  Given the rivalry and incommensurability 
of the values underlying both theories and the semantic variation of 
rights embedded in each theory, it is impossible to provide a rational 
single unified analysis of rights that does justice to the diverse and 
changing values that have shaped its various meanings. 
 
R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 180 (1952); HORACIO SPECTOR, ANALYTISCHE 
UND POSTANALYTISCHE ETHIK (1993); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 
34–35 (1944). 
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IV. THE MINIMAL MEANING OF RIGHTS 
The meaning of moral terms does not remain invariant across distinct 
value paradigms, even if the same names are maintained.  Now, because 
new value paradigms often retain the old normative vocabulary, the 
problem of the semantic variation of normative terms is seldom 
addressed, even by theorists who endorse value incommensurability.54  
Radicals who adopt a revisionist stance and try to eliminate some old 
normative terms can always be encountered.  For example, Jeremy 
Bentham, a well-known defender of the paradigm of collective interests, 
rejected natural rights with the famous dictum: “Natural rights are 
nonsense upon stilts.”55  But the language of rights has survived this 
radical assault and has been transferred from the classical paradigm to 
the new paradigm. 
The paradigm of subjective interests did not replace the old term, but 
radical conceptual change did occur, despite the fact that rights1 and 
rights2 share rule (2), that is, that correlativity to duties is a common 
feature of both concepts of rights.  This fact alone could not explain why 
the term rights is maintained as distinct from duties.  Although rights1 
and rights2 have radically different meanings because they are embedded 
in conflicting and incommensurable value paradigms, both terms share a 
minimal meaning.  This semantic core can be couched in the following 
inferential rule: 
 
(4) Acceptance of “A has a right against B that B does 
not do X” commits one to accepting that “state coercion 
can permissibly be used, or must be used, to secure 
fulfillment of B’s duty to A not to do X.” 
 
Curiously, neither the Will Theory nor the Interest Theory emphasizes 
the minimal meaning conveyed by inferential rule (4).  Yet Kant was 
mindful of this feature of rights.  In locating rights in the Doctrine of 
Right, he implicitly assumed that the point of moral rights, as opposed to 
moral duties, is to establish the conditions for the use of permissible 
 
 54. For instance, Joseph Raz offers a unified analysis of rights in RAZ, supra note 
26, at 165–66.  The great exception is Alasdair MacIntyre.  See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
 55. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in ‘NONSENSE UPON STILTS’: BENTHAM, 
BURKE, AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987). 
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coercion in society.56  In this respect, as in many others, Hart follows 
Kant.  Hart also claims that rights justify the use of public force.57 
The semantic variation of the term right must be accordingly 
qualified.  Although the term cannot be defined across incommensurable 
value paradigms, it has a common core that seems to be paradigm 
invariant.  Right is conceptually tied to state or public enforceability.  
This is a minimal content, though.  A theorist of rights would probably 
not be content with just claiming that rights are “events of any kind that 
may or must be secured by state coercion.”  But it was perhaps this 
minimal content of rights that made the term’s maintenance useful.  The 
important point is that the thesis of semantic variation does not stand in 
the way of the minimalist view, that is, the view that rights has an 
invariant core meaning across various normative vocabularies associated 
with incommensurable value paradigms.  This meaning is reflected in 
the basic fact that rights discourse performs a political function, 
whichever values that discourse seeks to respect or promote.  Although 
this view falls short of revealing the value assumptions that have shaped 
the semantics of rights, the paradox is that any analysis of rights that 
goes beyond the minimalist view will ultimately flounder in the waters 
of diachronic value pluralism and its resultant fragmentation of meaning. 
 
 
 56. KANT, supra note 45, at 31–32. 
 57. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175–91 (1955). 
